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A Rationale for Meeting Quotas Asymmetrically

Meister, J. Patrick and Main, Robert S.

Abstract
Under certain conditions, otherwise identical, competing firms may find it jointly preferable to face
differing degrees of trade barriers on individual products rather than symmetric trade barriers. The key is
the ability to reduce marginal production cost via research and development. The economic significance
of this insight is that there could be a role for a market for quota allotments. This insight also has
applications to Voluntary Export Restraints in which a priori symmetric, restricted firms may prefer to
have individual production levels allocated asymmetrically. This indicates the need for detailed studies of
how quotas are met by individual firms. (JEL F12, F13)

Introduction
In the literature on quotas, there seems to be a dearth of detailed empirical investigation of how
quotas are met by individual firms. The authors offer theoretical reasons why this void should be
filled and suggestions how it should be filled. In the case of Voluntary Export Restraints (VERs)
in particular (such as the U.S.-Japan automobile VER of the 1980s), one may guess that otherwise
equivalent firms would meet the quota equally (or that quotas would be allocated strictly by market
share). Also, the U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC) recently cleared the way for President
George W. Bush to raise trade barriers to steel imports. Again, one may guess that otherwise
equivalent firms would meet any quotas equally. About 40 countries from around the world had
planned a meeting in December (2001) to have each country give specific plans on how best to cut
steel production (see Matthews [2001]). In light of such activity and work on two-stage models
such as Newberry [1990], Meister [1992], and Salant and Shaffer [1998; 1999], it seems imperative
to examine how such quotas are met by constrained firms: not only at the firm level, but also by
product classification. Such two-stage models may take the following form. Firms choose how
much to spend on marginal cost (MC)-reducing research and development at stage one, and based
on resulting MCs, firms then choose quantities (or prices) in stage two. Salant and Shaffer [1999]
build on key insights pertaining to Cournot competition due to Bergstrom and Varian [1985a; b].
Salant and Shaffer [1999] summarize Bergstrom and Varian's insights by stating [p. 585]:
"Aggregate production costs strictly decline with no change in gross revenue or gross consumer
surplus if the prior actions strictly increase the variance of marginal costs without changing the
marginal cost stun."
Salant and Shaffer's [1999] contribution is that even when it is costly to induce asymmetries in
marginal costs (for example, via research and development expenditures), private and social
optima are asymmetric if the cost of inducing the second stage asymmetry is less than the reduction
in aggregate production costs.
This work differs from Salant and Shaffer's in that the authors analyze the possibility of
asymmetric quota allocations inducing differing levels of research and development expenditures
among a priori identical firms. This paper finds that if it is possible to reduce marginal production
costs via research and development, quota-constrained firms can see an increase in joint profits if
quotas are met asymmetrically (unambiguously so if goods are perfect substitutes). The economic
significance of this insight is that there could be a role for a market in which firms could trade
quota allotments. Since joint profits of a priori symmetric firms are higher if a quota is met
asymmetrically (rather than symmetrically), a firm would be willing to pay more for another firm's
quota allocation than that other firm's reservation price. Further, joint profit maximization is a
reasonable goal if side payments are costless. Allowing trade of quota allotments may be a close
substitute for costless side payments.
If side payments are not costless or allowable, allocating a quota asymmetrically may still be of
benefit to firms if they operate in multiple markets. For example, suppose two identical, competing
firms in country A export to country B. If country B enacts a quota restricting imports from country
A to a specified level, q, the two firms in country A may find joint profits will be higher if they
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meet the quota by allowing one firm to meet more than half the quota rather than having each firm
produce half. This can hold if firms can reduce marginal production cost via research and
development. Of course, the firm producing less than half the quota will not make as much profit
as the firm producing more than half the quota; thus, one may wonder if both firms would ever be
satisfied with such an arrangement. They may be if both firms produce two goods, y and z. Suppose
country B places a restrictive quota, on both goods. If one firm is allowed to produce more than
half the quota on good y while the other firm is allowed to produce more than half the quota, on
good z, both firms' individual profits can be higher than if they both meet the quotas on goods y
and z equally. (Richardson writes that VERs have the property of giving an "invitation to
supernational regulation and cartel-like market sharing among incumbent firms" [Richardson,
1994, p. 644].) Therefore, it is important for empirical analysts to investigate precisely how quotas
such as VERs are met: at the firm level and even by product classification. The remainder of the
paper is organized as follows. In the second section, the model is specified and analyzed, and
intuition is given for the results. The third section gives implications of the model and conclusions.
The Model
The model employed is one in which firms choose levels of marginal-cost-reducing research and
development, and then, based on these choices, decide how much output to produce (or what price
to charge if price competition). Generally, this type of setup is specified as a two-stage game with
research and development levels chosen in stage one and output levels (or prices) in stage two (see
Spencer and Brander [1983]). In this paper, the two-stage specification is not necessary since firms
are constrained by a quota.
Elements of the Model
Suppose there are two countries in the model: A and B. Two firms (1 and 2), located in country A,
are a priori identical (including selling perfect substitutes), and they export all output to country
B. The remaining elements of the model are as follows:
(i = 1, 2)

Firm i's output:

qi

Total output:

Σ i qi = Q

Firm i's level of
research and development:

i's cost of research
and development:

xi (where xi measures
the number of dollars
of reduction in the level of
constant marginal cost)
φ(xi) (φ0 >
0, φ00 > 0, and φ
is twice continuously
differentiable)
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i's research and
development-contingent
constant MC:

Inverse demand
facing firm i:

ci = C - xi (where C
is a positive constant)

p = f(Q), f0(Q) < 0, i = 1,2.

The inverse demand facing both firms are the same since firms are identical (and they sell perfect
substitutes). Also, the price, p, is a function of Q(= q1 + q2), and both firms receive the same price
for their product since goods are perfect substitutes.
Analysis of the Model (with quota)
Denote profit of the jth firm as:
(1) πj = pqj - qj[C - xj] - φ(xj) - Fj,
where qj is the quota assigned to the jth firm, C is the constant marginal cost in the absence of
research and development, φ symmetrically amortizes the cost of developing a production
technique over the life of that technique, and Fj is j's fixed cost. Further, the price, p, of the product
will not change if the total quota is not changed, since firms produce perfect substitutes. The only
means a firm has for maximizing profit in this setting is by varying the argument of φ. Therefore,
differentiating πj with respect to x and setting the resulting expression equal to zero yields:
(2) φ0(xj) = qj.
Equation (2) indicates that the firms should undertake research and development until the marginal
research and development cost of reducing constant-marginal production cost (φ0(xj)) equals the
marginal benefit (qj). Intuitively, the marginal benefit of reducing marginal production cost is qj
since if a firm were to reduce its constant marginal cost by $1, for example, it would enjoy a
production cost savings of qj · $1. Inverting (2) yields:
(3) xj = x(qj),
where x is the inverse function of φ0. Note, that if firm j were allowed a larger fraction of the quota
(yet keeping total quota the same), it would have incentive to undertake more research and
development since the marginal benefit (qj) would rise. Intuitively, the firm would have a larger
output base over which to reap the benefits of additional research and development expenditure.
Next, examine joint profit (Π = π1 + π2) for maxima and minima. Assume a planning board
allocates the total quota (q) between the two firms so that q = q1 + q2(or q2 = q - q1). Note dq2/dq1
= - 1. Therefore:
(4) Π = pq - Cq + q1x(q1) - φ(x(q1)) + q2x(q2) - φ(x(q2)) - F1 - F2.
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Note that the first two terms on the right-hand side of (4) do not change with reallocation of the
quota since the total quota, q, remains unchanged by assumption. Differentiating (4) with respect
to q1 yields:
(5) dΠ/dq1 = q1x0(q1) + x(q1) - φ0(x(q1))x0(q1 - q2x0(q2) - x(q2) + φ0(x(q2))x0(q2).
Since φ0(xj) = qj, from the first-order condition (in (2)), (5) can be written:
(6) dΠ/dq1 = x(q1) - x(q2),
which is zero if q1 = q2. The second derivative of Π with respect to q1 is:
d2Π/dq2, sub 1 = x0(q1) + x0(q2) > 0,
over the entire range of q1(q1 ∈ [0, q]). Since the first derivative is zero at q1 = q2 and the second
derivative is positive everywhere, Π has a strong relative minimum at q1 = q2. In fact, equal division
of the quota, is the only interior extremum. If there were another interior extremum, it would have
to be a maximum, which is ruled out by the second-order condition (7). Therefore, the maximum
of H is a corner solution, and Proposition 1 follows.
Proposition 1: If firms are a priori symmetric, sell perfect substitutes, and can reduce marginal
production cost via. research and development, allowing them to meet a quota, of q asymmetrically
rather than symmetrically increases joint profits.
Intuition
It may not be intuitively obvious that allowing two a priori symmetric firms to meet a quota
asymmetrically results in joint profits being higher than if the quota were met symmetrically-especially when joint research and development spending will be higher in the asymmetric case.
To gain intuition, consider the following scenario. Suppose the two symmetric firms were to meet
the quota, equally. Suppose also that they have chosen individually optimal research and
development levels (according to (3)). Thus, the firms would have identical constant marginal
production costs. Now for comparison, let firm 1 be allowed Δ more output and firm 2 be allowed
Δ less, and suppose initially that no changes in research and development levels are made. Firm
1's profit would increase by the same amount firm 2's profit would decrease (since there would be
no change in the price due to firms selling perfect substitutes). However, firm 1 could achieve even
higher profit by increasing research and development since its marginal benefit from research and
development would now exceed the marginal cost of research and development. The marginal
benefit is now higher due to firm 1 producing more.
Firm 2 can make its reduction in profit less if it does less research and development than in the
symmetric case. If it were at the research and development level that would have been optimal in
the symmetric case, marginal benefit of research and development would be less than marginal
cost of research and development in the asymmetric case. This is due to firm 2 producing less than
it would in the symmetric case. Thus, firm 2 should do less research and development than it would
5

in the symmetric case. Then firm 2's profit will not be as much lower (than the symmetric case) as
it otherwise would be. Therefore, firm 2's reduction in profit will be less than firm 1's gain in profit.
Implications and Conclusions
The fact that the maximum is a corner solution has au important implication. There is a potential
role for a market for quota allotments. With two a priori, symmetric firms, one firm could purchase
another firm's quota, and both could be better off than if they meet the quota symmetrically. Since
joint profit is higher in the symmetric case, the firm allowed more than half the quota gains more
than the other firm loses. Therefore, a firm could purchase the other firm's quota for more than that
firm would make from producing its own quota and still make more than it would producing just
its own quota. Alternatively, a firm is willing to pay more to acquire the other firm's quota than
that other firm is willing to sell it for. If the policy goal is to benefit business owners, the sale of
quotas should be allowed since both firms can gain from such trade. Note also, that reallocating a
quota would not affect the price if goods are perfect substitutes. Therefore, consumer welfare of
the country importing products would not be affected. However, if the policy goal is to benefit the
factors of production, then individual quotas should be assigned equally to maximize factor
payments (since total production costs are higher when constant marginal costs are identical rather
than asymmetric, ceteris paribus [Bergstrom and Varian, 1985]).
As Salant and Shaffer [1998] point out, "joint profit maximization is an appropriate objective when
side payments are costless." Allowing firms to trade quota allocations conceivably could be a low
cost substitute for side payments. If side payments are costly, allocating quotas asymmetrically
may still be appropriate if firms operate in multiple markets. If two a priori, symmetric firms (1
and 2) produce two goods (y and z) subject to quotas, firm 1 may be allowed more than half the
quota for good y while firm 2 is allowed more than half the quota for good z. In this case, joint
profits would be higher than if both firms met both quotas symmetrically. Such an arrangement
may substitute for side payments or allowing trade of quota allotments. Therefore, it is important
for empirical analysts to investigate precisely how quotas such as VERs are met--at the firm level
and even by product classification.
The authors wish to thank James Levinsohn, Stephen Salant, and an anonymous referee for helpful
comments.
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